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Abstract: I identify two types of evidence: one based on “linear” rationality (LR) and the other based on “fractal”
rationality (FR). For LR, evidence depends only on systematic coherence, and all other sources of knowledge
(intuitive, perceptive, symbolic, poetic, moral, etc.) are marginalized. For FR, evidence requires an approach more
adherent to the “irregularities” of life. LR philosophically entails a Neoplatonist and Cartesian account on identity,
whereas FR entails Plato’s account on identity and diversity as coessential.
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1. Starting with an anthropology rather than a theory
What do we talk about when we talk about argumentation? It would be easy to start a discussion
on evidence and persuasion by taking into account some “grand narratives”, to quote J. F. Lyotard
(1984) on the role of reasoning and speech in finding an agreement about the evidence of an object
of proof, both privately and publicly. But this is exactly what we should not do when talking about
evidence and persuasion in contexts characterized by inevitable diversities. I mean, the risk is to
look at the state of the art always from a dominantly theoretical point of view, when the previous
choices regarding the reference theory have already been made. These choices imply, in fact, an
argumentative commitment which should in turn be justified, pushing us into the closed alley of a
regress to infinity. For this reason it would instead be more profitable to take into consideration
the anthropological conditions in which individuals act and theorize.
When we consider whatsoever issue, we always consider it from a here-and-now, concrete
situation characterized by an overlapping of individuals’ beliefs, which are produced by inner
activities, and are expressed by reasonings, feelings, and ethical standards. Thus, when we
maintain that the relation between evidence and persuasion depends on the underlying theory of
knowledge, we should clarify what kind of anthropology we are dealing with in regard to space,
time and conditions.
Something could be assumed as ‘evident’: (i) either as a proposition which is valid
according to a certain account on logic – typically, as a coherent deduction from some premises;
or, (ii) as a fact ascertained by empirical tools (from the Latin evidens = ex + videre, [knowing by
seeing]) – as occurs with the so-called scientific evidence. Both (i) and (ii) are current
interpretations dating back to the origins of the modern age, and both fit very well with a
rationalist anthropology. But in the light of a different anthropology – as the one common to Plato
and Aristotle – evidence could also be provided (iii) by some speech procedures connected to
pistis (and not only to episteme), as it is the case with dialectics, whose premises are neither
axioms nor experimental standards (“protocols”) but widely influential arguments well known to
all experts in the matter (endoxa).
In cases (i), (ii), and (iii) persuasion is not necessary or, at most, it is a character intrinsic to
truth itself (a point I will explain better, shortly). Persuasion becomes necessary when such means
(analytical demonstrations, experimental tests, and dialectical – “critical” – discussions) cannot
work. This happens when no stipulative conditions are available or when agreement on premises is
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lacking for various reasons. In those moments, the floor is open to the “likely” (eikos) – that is, for
Aristotle, what can be otherwise than it is – and the appeal to effective (i.e. persuasive) grounds
for evidence is strictly required (Rhet. I.2,1357b).
What changes in this case, in comparison to the previous (i), (ii), and (iii) cases, is the
presence of a concrete (and therefore possibly unskilled or slightly interactive) audience: an
audience who does not share stipulations, empirical knowledge, or the expert’s commonplaces
(endoxa). This is a typically rhetorical situation – case (iv) –, which was familiar to a nonindividualist and non-rationalist anthropology like the one of the Greek polis with its agora.
2. A reasoning for the irregularity of life
In a recent article, C. Tindale alludes to “linear rationality” as something that “isolates actions into
points in a sequence and fails to treat them as issuing from lives in which values and beliefs are
integrated in complex webs” (p. 15).1 In other words, a kind of rationality claiming for neutrality
and impartiality, (i.e. absence of valuable choices), that is taken, contradictorily, as a valuable
choice. This has always been the line for modernity, which broke out with Cartesianism, and
known well by Plato and Aristotle.
Of the two, especially the first criticized, such choice-not-to-choose if intended as the only
authentic form of knowledge. In his dialogue with Meno, for instance, the Athenian makes
possible for a young slave to demonstrate (a version of) the Pythagorean theorem, giving him only
some simple axioms and a minimum method. Plato’s intention was to show how geometry, which
does not seem to imply discussion on values, is an elementary (though useful, of course) form of
knowledge as well to show how dialectics is, conversely, a higher form of knowledge, capable of
sustaining epistemic demonstrations like the Pythagorean, even with uneducated people.
Interestingly, in his Republic, Plato (according to Heidegger) deals with two meanings of truth: as
orthotes (linearity) and as aletheia (revelation),2 implying another means, apart from deductive
coherence, through which to provide evidence.
We can therefore assume that in classical theories, analytical demonstrations (apodeixis),
which are described as linear (orthos), do not exclude or marginalize other kinds of reasoning
which are not linear. The nonlinear reasonings – as it has been specified by Aristotle in some of
his works3 – are the ones coming from pistis (trust), like dialectics and rhetoric (Piazza, 2011).
Trust then depends on the concrete Lebensform (Wittgenstein, 1958; Boncompagni, 2011) in
which a discussion takes place. According to Tindale, nonlinear rationality springs from “a system
of managed diversity” (as he defines the “form of life”) ( p. 16). We could say that nonlinear
rationality fits with situations in which stipulations and expert knowledge are not on hand,
whereas linear rationality works only with abstract objects in abstract contexts.
My intention is to use a term (and a concept) antagonistic to that of Tindale, to designate an
intellectual activity capable of capturing the roughness of Lebensformen with all their possible
diversities and disagreements. The term I would like to propose here is “fractal rationality.”
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Fractal, in mathematics, [is] any of a class of complex geometric shapes that commonly have
“fractional dimension,” a concept first introduced by the mathematician Felix Hausdorff in
1918. Fractals are distinct from the simple figures of classical, or Euclidean, geometry – the
square, the circle, the sphere, and so forth. They are capable of describing many irregularly
1
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and veritas sententiarum (II.34).
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shaped objects or spatially nonuniform phenomena in nature such as coastlines and
mountain ranges. The term fractal, derived from the Latin word fractus (“fragmented,” or
“broken”), was coined by the Polish-born mathematician Benoit B. Mandelbrot etc.
This divide between an Euclidean perspective that conceives only regular shapes, and a
fractal one that manages all irregularly shaped objects,4 is precisely the turning point of my
argument on rationality and its connection with evidence and persuasion, which I try to clear up in
the following section.
3. The privilege of regularity: A short history
Once distinguished and named, these two species of rationality, i.e. linear and fractal – or to say
better these two different attitudes towards reasoning – I would like to refer to previous studies of
mine focused on the origin of “systematic thought” in Western legal philosophy (Manzin, 2008). I
do this because the exclusive preference for linear rationality (episteme) and the subsidiary
contempt for reasoning based on trust (pistis) is deeply rooted in the history of Western thought.
This section of my paper will therefore provide a (necessarily) brief overview on how the privilege
of linearity broke off the fractal tradition of dialectics and rhetoric that dated back to the ancient
paideia.
The privilege of “systematic thought” is a consequence of the success gained by the later
developments of Platonism (so-called Neoplatonism), due to the reception of Plotinus’ theories
(203/205 - 270 AD) and the drafting of The Enneads made by his favorite pupil, Porphirius (233/4
- ?305 AD).5 According to the philosophical accounts, which were worked out by the many
scholars who followed Neoplatonic teachings, identity and unity should be considered the golden
standard for knowledge. All visible and invisible things, which seem prima facie to be different
and many, should be regarded as parts of a whole that, in its being, forms an absolute and perfect
“One.” The search for identity and unity – maybe a counterpart of the real historical situation,
characterized by the fracture of Roman political and civil institutions and by a growing sense of
incertitude – became the way to the supreme ideal for a great number of philosophers.
In the fifth century AD, when joining the Neoplatonic Academy of Athens, Proclus (412 485 AD) picked up the inheritance of the diadochoi (“successors” – as the Neoplatonists called
themselves) and developed it in his most influential work: Elements of Theology, where the One
(en) stays at the top of a universal hierarchical triadic system that incorporates, under the pure
essence of God (identity of the One to itself), all the other ranks of being (“elements”), either
visible or invisible. In “systematic thought,” each element is linked to the other according to a
continuous ascending or descending line, leaving no room for interruptions or fractality – an
expression of a sort of horror vacui.
After the closing of the Academy of Athens (529 AD), ruled by Christian emperor Justinian
the Great, the privilege of linearity and identity did not cease; it was simply translated into
orthodox Christian terms, thanks to the work of a mysterious writer who named himself Dionysius
the Aeropagite, pseudonym of a Syrian author of the fifth or maybe sixth century AD. The Corpus
Dionysianum (or Corpus Aeropagiticum) spread widely throughout the byzantine empire, but it
was “discovered” in Western Europe only after its translation into Latin by John Scotus Eriugena
in the eight century AD. Thanks to Scotus’ translation (and much later thanks to the Liber de
causis), Dionysian paradigm of hierarchical order gradually became a normative one in
philosophy, theology, and law, as it can easily be ascertained looking at the Scholastic tradition –
once again, maybe as a counterpart of the real historical situation, dominated by the struggle
between ecclesiastical and political powers.
4
5
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Such obsession for linearity and order in a world of diversities and conflicts is symptomatic,
and let us suppose whenever an era is felt as one of dramatic change and discontinuity, people (it
does not matter if learned or not) are inclined to prefer a thought capable of reassuring against the
unpredictability of events.
This is the case of Descartes (1596 - 1650), who maintains that the rising of doubts
(discontinuity) must be the starting point of a process of analytical decomposition of the complex
elements into simpler ones, and of their successive composition into a deductive linear chain
(continuity). Descartes’ grand récit pushed dialectics and rhetoric (i.e. fractal rationality) out of
the stage of ‘authentic’ knowledge, relegating them to mere literature. After Descartes, and until
quite recent times, notwithstanding the fierce opposition of some isolated authors (the Neapolitan
G. B. Vico [1668 - 1744] first and above all), Cartesian narrative and the paradigm of linear
rationality dominated the epistemological landscape of Western thought for centuries, creating a
gap between the “two cultures” (Snow, 2012) – in my terms, the linear (“Science” with capital
initial) and the fractal (the humanities).
4. Identity vs difference (and a third way)
It could now be of some interest to know that the authors in favor of what I have called fractal
rationality – starting with Plato himself – did not oppose difference and multiplicity to identity and
unity. This point is delicate and deserving of further depth.
It is notorious that Plato put logic based on pistis (and especially dialectics) alongside
science based on episteme, depending on the premises provided for the discussion. This option for
complementarity, which avoids an absolute divide between linear rationality and other kinds of
speech activities, is rooted in Plato’s account against dualism, as reported in his Sophist. In this
dialogue, the Athenian criticizes his juvenile preference for a strict separation between being and
not being, that he had inherited from Parmenides’ traditional doctrine, by saying that “in a certain
sense not-being is, and being, on the other hand, is not” (Soph. 241d). Plato establishes the
coessentiality of identity and difference as a basis for his metaphysics, a basis that turns out to be
the very antidote to every form of radical dualism (as Gnosticism, for instance), and specifically to
the separation between episteme (based on deduction from ‘self-evident’ premises) and pistis
(based on confrontation between opinions).6
To give a fairly trivial example, saying that A is not B (difference) helps to determine that A
is A (identity or sameness). In other words, after Plato’s “parricide,” not being pros eteron
(compared to the other) will no longer be a matter of absolute opposition among A and B, C, or
those following but, rather, a matter of confrontation finalized to the best determination of what A
really is. With the appreciable consequence that, instead of building walls between identities we
can face all possible opinions about A without fear of negation, saves this way to value of relation.
The Platonic crucial idea of the coessentiality of identity and difference can also be
understood in the light of the contradictory account of the ‘two principles’ (archai), typical of
every dualism, according to which there are two opposite principles: the one of being and the one
of not being, both to be intended as separate and incomparable among each other. The
contradiction lays in the evidence that, if each of them is principle of something, none is actually
the principle: there would, in fact, be a principle by virtue of which A is A (being), and another
principle by virtue of which A is not A (not being), whereas a principle is a principle if by virtue
of it all things – and not only some – are. Then to be the principle it must take into one either

6

According to this kind of dualism, knowledge based on episteme is always true, while the one coming from
opinions is always false. In this sense, whatsoever act of persuasion is irredeemably deceptive.

4

identity (of A to A) or difference (of A from ¬A).7 This is the reason Plato rejects the supremacy
of identity without rejecting identity itself.
An idea which will be broadly – and under many aspects better – developed by his pupil
Aristotle, who would assign a very particular role to the principle of non-contradiction and put
dialectics and rhetoric (both coming from pistis) alongside analytics (coming from episteme) is a
means capable of managing the difference of opinions in dialogical situations and public
discourse.
What is relevant for me at this point of my discussion is to stress the existence of two
different accounts on rationality – the linear and the fractal – which have remote origins in the
history of philosophy. The linear is based upon the overestimation of mere identity (A=A), while
the fractal is based upon the appreciation of the coessentiality of identity and difference (A=A and
A≠¬A). To be shorter, I will hereinafter refer to the latter as the one of “diversity.”
5. Identity-Based and diversity-based evidence, and the role of persuasion
The approach based on diversity and the one based on identity coexisted in Western thought for
centuries, although with fluctuating luck. The first one – the fractal – which is outlined above, was
consciously or unconsciously rooted in a classic trend deriving from Plato and Aristotle, declined
with modernity and survived only in a literary guise. The second – the linear – which is well
represented by Cartesianism, ended up occupying the whole scene of ‘authentic’ knowledge,
rapidly assisted by the power of technique (that it made possible).
If we accept this account on a divided rationality we should then also distinguish between
“identity-based” and “diversity-based” evidence, as I mentioned in Section 1.
The identity-based evidence has a concrete nature, while diversity-based evidence is more
abstract – abstract in the sense that the object of proof has to be ‘extracted’ from the living
situation of the here-and-now, characterized by “a variety of forms of life that overlap and
crisscross in a variety of ways” (Tindale 2019, p. 13), and shifted in a mental order where every
shape is conceived as regular (to recall one of the founders of modern scientific thought, the
Italian G. Galilei [1564 - 1642], an order in which we assume that “[the] great book [of nature] is
written in mathematical language, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric
figures”) (1957, p. 3).
“Identity-based” evidence, which is grounded on mere formal consistency of conclusions
with respect to the premises, could hardly be intended, within a classical perspective, as something
that implies persuasion in the proper sense of the word. According to Plato and Aristotle, it is
possible to speak of persuasion only in relation with truth8 (it is notorious that they fought against
Sophists’ relativism and their inappropriate use of speech techniques aimed at convincing people
about every sort of opinion). For them, persuasion without truth is simply a deception – a “pseudopersuasion” (Zadro, 1983) (Plato and Aristotle, for instance, complain the eristic use of syllogisms
– eristike techne – by which an argument is presented as logic only to hide its propagandistic
purpose [Plato, Taeth. 165d; Aristotle, Soph. Ref. 33.183b]).
As underlined by A. Zadro (1983), to understand the relation between persuasion and truth
we should first take into account the two forms of Greek genitive – the subjective and the
objective. In the case of subjective genitive, persuasion of truth means: the persuasion that spreads
from truth itself, as it happens with mathematical demonstrations. In this case, evidence is a
character of the premises (it comes before) that is “preserved” in the conclusions, if they are
coherently deducted. This kind of persuasion can work only with expert people, for whom
7
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premises are clear by themselves (‘self-evident’). In the case of objective genitive, persuasion of
truth means “proper”: persuasion to truth, in the sense that evidence is the outcome of an
argumentative process (it comes after) and – consequently – the floor is open to the means of
persuasion suitable for different types of audience (psycagogia).
This is exactly the purpose of rhetoric and implies that evidence on things can be achieved
“in many ways” (pollachos legetai) (Arist., Phys. I.2, 185a; Met. IV, 1003a), and not exclusively
through the demonstrations of experts. In other words, if “evidence” comes from the Latin videre
(seeing), an object of proof can be seen differently with different eyes, as it occurs when more
people discuss something in concrete situations, particularly in public contexts. There may be
some who see above all with the eyes of the heart (pathos), others who are sensitive to the moral
attitude of the speaker (ethos), and others who look more at the logical frame (logos). Thus
persuasion has to be differently declined.
It is precisely the concreteness of the situations that brings into play the variety of means by
which an object of proof can be assumed, given that every stimulus coming from outside is
processed by individuals according to logic, feelings, and moral values interacting with each other
(no need here to take out some recent neuroscientific discoveries about the so-called “system 1”
and “system 2”) (Kahneman, 2011; Damasio, 1994). With extreme care for the diversity of
psychai, the pioneers of the fractal account deepened on the role of ethos, pathos, and logos in
building arguments, providing a set of intuitive, perceptive, symbolic, poetic, and moral tools.
Their guiding idea was that reasoning consists of a continuous adaptation to concrete situations
and that nothing is more reasonable than the inevitable clashes among different opinions,
especially when deciding what to do. In fact, they maintained that if reasoning needs to ascertain
what counts as evident under the contextual aspect, it is not in order to ‘neutrally’ establish how
things go on but to move from a certain state of affairs to another. This means that according to
the fractal diversity-based account, knowing and making (quiet and motion, in Platonic terms)
mutually implicate one another, and an agreement on something as ‘evident’ – provided by
persuasion – is always oriented by some need to act, regardless of modern Hume’s guillotine.
For the supporters of fractal rationality, evidence is often problematic and requires recourse
as to what is defined today a “meta-analytical” approach. It is problematic because disagreements
are physiological and not pathological (as they are considered in a linear mentality). Since the
time of Heraclitus, eris (disagreement) has been interpreted as the arche (principle, origin) of dike
(justice) (Fragm. 22b; 80 DK) meaning that difference of opinions is the basis on which people
discuss what would be right or not right to do. No disagreement means, no search for truth, no
reasonable interactions between individuals or groups of individuals, no need for persuasion,
means, in the end, no polis.
We might wonder at this point what room would be left for persuasion, if not the only one
guaranteed by the subjective genitive – the ‘necessity’ to admit as evident what spreads from truth
itself in the eyes of undisputed experts. No need to say how undesirable it would be to live in a
‘Perfect City’ where all doubts were resolved by ‘linear’ experts like these.
6. Conclusion
I was wondering at the beginning what it meant, from the point of view of a theory of
argumentation, to refer to evidence. It seems clear that something is evident when we are
convinced that it is ultimately justified by a series of criteria (that also) we do share. These criteria
do not belong to a hyperuranic dimension (we could only claim that they do), and their
shareability depends on the concrete situation in which we operate and on the purposes on which
we use these criteria to check if something is evident.
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In this complex process of selection and application, rationality obviously plays a key role,
together with other concurrent factors (perceptive, intuitive, aesthetic, moral, etc.) that integrate
human knowledge. The relationship between these factors is, of course, not without its problems.
The thesis I have tried to argue here is that the rationality supporting evidence has been
interpreted in the history of Western Philosophy in two different and opposing ways: The oldest is
what I have defined as “fractal” and the modern is what C. Tindale (2019) effectively defined as
“linear.”
According to my studies, they are not simply two equal and opposite kinds of rationality (the
linear one based on the noetic supremacy of identity or sameness; the fractal one based on the
noetic supremacy of difference). Instead, the linear one is a kind of rationality that assumes
identity – and only it – as the unique and exclusive standard of perfection; whereas fractal
rationality assumes both identity and diversity as co-essential. As I explained earlier (Section 4),
fractal rationality was perfectly formulated by Plato when he committed his “parricide.” Linear
rationality also has precedents in ancient Greek thought, but it triumphed on the world stage only
with Descartes and his successors, becoming the dominant form of thought in the West.
The purely linear rationality eliminates the need for persuasion (and, therefore, the
argumentation itself), and reduces evidence to the ‘self-evidence’ of formal demonstrations,
which, however, have a totally abstract character. On the contrary, fractal rationality implies the
need for persuasion since it organizes the most diverse discourses without presuming to have a
‘geometrically’ perfect model. It does not deny that argumentation must also proceed through
simplifications, that is, reductions of multiplicity (diversity) to unity (identity); but it does deny
that the unity achieved implies the definitive elimination of differences. In fact, fractal rationality
admits the possibility of different forms of complexity reduction and, thus, admits different
possibilities for reaching evidence, variable according to the concrete situation (which exists as a
fact or, better, as a set of facts, and not only as mere interpretation).
Personally, I believe that it is necessary to overcome the rigid division between an exclusive
linear rationality (science) and a fractal rationality that is, after all, very little rational (the
humanities), since this summa divisio is totally internal to modern and Cartesian linear rationality.
I believe, instead, that it is appropriate to cultivate the model of fractality in order to combine
persuasion and rationality.
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